Slope of Hope Blog Posts

Slope initially began as a blog, so this is where most of the website’s content resides. Here we have tens of thousands of posts dating back over a decade. These are listed in reverse chronological order. Click on any category icon below to see posts tagged with that particular subject, or click on a word in the category cloud on the right side of the screen for more specific choices.

Federal Home Loan Bank System (by Leisa)

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(I posted this on my blog in November.  It might be more than Slopers may want to slog through, but it might be worth a cursory view).

I've become recently intrigued with an institution that I rarely
hear anything about: The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB). With the
implosion the credit markets involving all things related to home
financing, this agency came under the purview of the FHFA along with
Fannie and Freddie. My objective is not to go into any exhaustive
analysis or even cultivate an opinion. Rather, I'm just reminding you
of this banking system that we does not get much press–and to hit a
few high points. I've no special knowledge on any of this, and
everything that I present here is from 'stuff' easily found on the
internet.

Here's an overview from their website that you can find here. The emphasis added is mine.

The
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) was created on July 30, 2008,
when the President signed into law the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008. The Act created a world-class, empowered regulator with
all of the authorities necessary to oversee vital components of our
country’s secondary mortgage markets – Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the
Federal Home Loan Banks. In addition, this law combined the staffs of
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the Federal
Housing Finance Board (FHFB), and the GSE mission office at the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). With a very
turbulent market facing our nation, the strengthening of the regulatory
and supervisory oversight of the 14 housing-related GSEs is imperative.
The establishment of FHFA will promote a stronger, safer U.S. housing
finance system. As of June 2008, the
combined debt and obligations of these GSEs totaled $6.6 trillion,
exceeding the total publicly held debt of the USA by $1.3 trillion. The
GSEs also purchased or guaranteed 84% of new mortgages.
Considering
the impact of these GSEs on the U.S. economy and mortgage market, it is
critical that we intensify our focus on oversight of Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks.

I thought the
highlighted text to be an eye-popping fact. There are two other GSE's:
Farmer Mac (AGM) and the Farm Credit Administration–both serving
agriculture. Readers may remember the lonely trade that I did not
take–shorting AGM. Here's the post. Let it serve as a reminder that there are many jewels of ideas for trading that are not in mainstream media.

The FHLB is a collection of 12 banks (with links to their websites):

Boston | New York | Pittsburgh | Atlanta | Cincinnati |Indianapolis | Chicago
Des Moines | Dallas | Topeka | San Franciso | Seattle

Each
of the above are wholesale banks serving as a cooperative within the
geographic areas that they serve. As a cooperative, they have members

FHLBank
members include thrift institutions, commercial banks, credit unions,
and insurance companies. A financial institution joins the FHLBank
district that serves the state where the institution's home office or
principal place of business is located.

From website.

which purchase stock from the FHLB that serves that geographic area of the member.

The
FHLB system allows member banks access to affordable financing for
their lending operations. The member banks, in exchange for these
loans, pledge collateral. Accordingly, the FHLB debt issuances are
supported by collateral. The quality of this collateral is
derivative–meaning that the value is ultimately derived from: (1)
credit quality of the end borrowers and (2) valuation of the
collateral. You see where I'm going with this, right?

The table below is taken from the July 2009 Report on Federal Home Loan Bank Collateral for Advances and Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products This table shows the concentration of Subprime and Non-traditional Mortgage Collateral.
(Click image to view)

The next table shows the loan to collateral ratio

(Click image to view)
Source: July 2009 Report on Federal Home Loan Bank Collateral for Advances and Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products

The
highlighted data point is FHLB-Seattle which was recently cited by the
FHFA as being under capitalized. The last column is the system wide
coverage ratio of 160% which increased from 152% in 2007. Also it is
important to note that each FHLB is jointly and severally liable for
the obligations of the others.

The collateral offered may also
include mortgage backed securities that the member banks might hold. It
is a reminder of the cyclical nature of of this 'stuff'. Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae securities that many conservative
institutions bought due to their perceived safety. It is important to
note that ONLY Ginnie Mae Securities are backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States. Freddie and Fannie are 'wards of the
state' as the are in conservatorship. But the domino effect of an
implosion is evident as these balance sheet holdings served as
collateral and supported capital of the institutions that held them.

For any of you who read financial statements, the next graphic Taken from

First Federal of Northern Michigan Bancorp, Inc.

press release shows where you see the stock purchased from FHLB as well as the advances.

(
Click image to view)



If
any of this whetted your appetite to learn more, I'd encourage you to
seek out the following resources and perhaps appropriate counseling!

Q-Tip (by Drainage)

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Q-Tip

This is a sad story about the most babyish of the Baby
Bells, Qwest (Q). Aside from its legendary bad telephone service, Qwest has
distinguished itself by bravely going forward with a strategy of devoid of
wireless services, largely because they couldn’t afford it after what Joe
Nacchio did to the company while he was “running” it. Until a few weeks ago, I
thought they had the potential to make a respectable broadband play in their
territory – the same type of battle that Verizon is making with Comcast and
Time Warner.  

Let me share a personal experience I had in trying to help
them create broadband competition in my area.  I had heard that Qwest is building out fiber-optic broadband
and
that it may have
hit
my (upscale) neighborhood by now, so I checked out on the Web. Their web form for
more details requires a phone number (uncool) so I tried using their chat
instead. Here is the chat transcript:

Thank you
for using Qwest.com. A Qwest Sales and Service Consultant will
be with you in just a moment.

Qwest Rep: Thank you for contacting Qwest.  How may I help you today? 
Drainage: I currently am using Comcast broadband
service at my house and wonder if I can get a higher speed connection
Qwest Rep: Let's take a look. One moment.
Qwest Rep: Up to 3M Downstream / 640K Upstream is the fastest speed
available at this location.
Drainage: I don't want to provide a phone number, but if you can,
please notify me via email to let me know if/when I can get a higher speed. I
am currently getting about 6Mbs down and 3Mbs up
Qwest Rep: I will be right with you. 
Qwest Rep: There are no due dates for expansion of services at this
location at this time.
Drainage: OK, Thanks for checking. Bye.

So, instead
of telling me that I would get put on the list, the response pretty much
indicates "it isn't happening in your lifetime". Encouraging, huh?
Now let’s take a look at some charts.

Q_daily

The daily
chart looks encouraging, with the 50 and 200 SMA’s sloping upwards and a nice
rally on volume in early January. 

Q_weekly

But the
weekly chart presents a more ambiguous picture, with some recovery from the
broken uptrend from October 2008 to July 2009, but now encountering very stiff
resistance at about $4.70. There is the possibility that this is an inverse
head and shoulders pattern, but any hope for a sharp up-move to complete the inverse
H&S pattern is tempered by the company’s broken business model and their
ongoing race to the bottom in customer service.

Discarding Techniques – (by Biffermas)

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"No matter what your spiritual condition is, no matter where you find yourself in the universe, your choice is always the same: to expand your awareness or contract it."

 

Thaddeus Golas


Many moons ago I used extreme readings of the NYSE Advance-Deline Index for trading entry signals. The plan was simple back then: fade all extreme upside A/D readings by shorting the ES on the following market open.  Once my position was filled I placed two additional orders.  The first was a hard stop loss of 10 ES points, and the second was my target of 20 points.  Position size was determined based on total account loss – I would allow no more than a 1% total account loss per trade.  Trading this was highly beneficial for many years, but I evolved beyond for a simple reason – it eventually stopped working!

New posting chart (2)

Being a
nostalgic guy I dusted my old technique off and evaluated it's effectiveness
over the last six months.  Tabulating
the results we find five wins and nine losses. 
With each loss dropping 1% of total account value and each win
bolstering 2% the total result over six months is +0.9%.  After commissions that's essentially a coin
toss (capital is tied up in a fruitless endeavor as well, which is very
negative).

What's
the point of this?  Be adaptable!  Don't be a stone in the river, Grasshopper!

1 –
Techniques are cyclical.  In some
markets they work, and some they don't.

2 – It's
important to evaluate your techniques periodically and tweak / eliminate as
needed.

3 – Revisit old techniques occasionally to see if they're working again.  When powerful trends diminish and a long, grinding sideways market returns, this technique will likely bear fruit once again.